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BANKCARD'S REVENGE: A CRITIQUE OF THE 1984
CONSUMER CREDIT AMENDMENTS TO THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
Paul M. Black*
Michael J. Herbert**
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually from the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code1 in 1978,
creditors attempted to roll back what they perceived to be the
Code's undue bias toward bankrupts.2 The Code was branded a
debtor's paradise practically beckoning borrowers to shed their
debts painlessly and needlessly. It was certainly true that the
number of bankruptcy filings rose substantially during the late
1970's and early 1980's,4 and that some creditors attributed at least
* B.A., 1982, Washington & Lee University; J.D., 1985, T.C. Williams School of Law, Uni-
versity of Richmond.
** Associate Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
B.A., 1974, John Carroll University; J.D., 1977, University of Michigan. The authors grate-
fully acknowledge the research assistance of John L. Squires, T.C. Williams School of Law,
University of Richmond, Class of 1987, and deeply appreciate the thoughtful comments
made by Hon. Blackwell N. Shelley, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Eastern District of Virginia.
1. In this article, "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code" refers to the current version of Title 11
of the United States Code, originally enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-151326 (West
Supp. 1985)). "Bankruptcy Reform Act" refers to the Code and related provisions of federal
bankruptcy law prior to their amendment in 1984. "Bankruptcy Act" or "Act" refers to the
former Title 11, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976), repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
2. In this article, "debtor" generally refers to an obligor and "bankrupt" to a person sub-
ject to proceedings under the Code. When the Code refers to the "debtor," it means "bank-
rupt." Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 101(12) (West Supp. 1985).
3. In the view of Congressman Jack Brooks:
It has been estimated that as much as $1 billion of debt is unnecessarily discharged
annually under the present bankruptcy system. As a result, consumer credit has be-
come expensive and difficult to obtain. Consumers, especially those of middle and
lower income groups, are paying dearly for the laxity we have introduced into our
bankruptcy laws.
130 CONG. REc. H1812 (daily ed. March 21, 1984).
4. See generally Ayers, Reforming the Reform Act: Should the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 be Amended to Limit the Availability of Discharges to Consumers?, 17 NE.w ENG. L.
REV. 719, 719-20 (1982). Cf. Woodward & Woodward, Exemptions as an Incentive to Volun-
tary Bankruptcy: An Empirical Study, 88 COM. L.J. 309 (1983).
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some of this to the Code's presumed generosity.5 Whether the
Code actually caused any of the increase in filings is, to put it
mildly, controversial. Other factors, most significantly the general
economic malaise of the past fifteen years, undoubtedly played a
far larger role. Yet the perception that the Code was little more
than a charter for deadbeats was not entirely baseless. It was, at
least in theory, possible for some debtors to use the Code to shed
debts which they were able to pay without hardship.
The horror story with which one of the authors was constantly
regaled was that of the newly graduated medical doctor whose
debts were high, assets meagre, and income potential immense.
The doctor (or, for that matter, any high debt/low asset/high in-
come debtor) could obtain a discharge of his/her debts for slight
cost-the liquidation value of his/her assets. Worse, a significant
portion of such assets as there were could be protected under state
or, where applicable, federal exemptions. Worse still, the bankrupt
could, by filing under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7, stretch
the liquidation out over a three to five year period.' Not only
5. Remarks by Congressman G.V. Montgomery epitomize this attitude:
Mr. Chairman, for the last couple of years in going home, I have been getting many
complaints from the owners of small businesses about the large number of persons
taking bankruptcy. It was pointed out to me that a number of these persons taking
bankruptcy had good jobs. They could pay their obligations, but it was the easier
route to go chapter 7 and take bankruptcy and not worry about their debts. I would
like to read part of a letter from a friend of mine who is a minority person and has a
small business in my State:
I would like to take this opportunity to again express my concerns about the
number of bankruptcies that are taking place in our country and how these bank-
ruptcies have affected small businesses. We have been in business for over 40 years
and we have never seen as many people taking bankruptcy and starting right over
in business, as we have seen in the last two years. We have been the victim of over
$20,000 in losses through bankruptcies during this period.
As one bankruptcy official told me when we went to Louisiana to try to collect
for some products we had sold, he looked at me and told me that, that court was
there to assist the people that were going bankrupt and not to assist the people
who were still in business and when I explained to him how these bankruptcies
were affecting our business, his remark was, the profitable thing to do today is to go
bankrupt ....
Well, something is wrong when the bankruptcy laws encourage people to take
bankruptcy and then a small businessman goes before the courts and they tell him,
"We can't help you at all."
130 CONG. REc. H1812 (daily ed. March 21, 1984). See also Congressman Jack Brooks' com-
ment that since the enactment of "the present Bankruptcy codes [sic]," personal bankrupt-
cies had "run 200 percent higher annually than they had in the 12 preceeding years." Id.
6. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1982) allowed a Chapter 13 plan to extend for a
three-year period. With court approval "for cause," the plan period could be extended to
five years. Id. This provision was not changed by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
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would such extension make bankruptcy still more attractive to the
debtor, it would also increase the risk that the creditors would not
get even the original liquidation value of the bankrupt's property.
The reason was simple: if the bankrupt's assets were destroyed or
otherwise diminished in value during the plan period, the bank-
rupt could freely modify his/her Chapter 13 payments downward. 7
Adding insult to injury, such payments as the debtor had made
during the ninety days immediately preceding the filing were gen-
erally avoidable as preferences.' Finally, the creditors were to a
large degree shut out of the proceedings; the pre-Code right to a
formal voice in Chapter 13' was eliminated;10 and the creditors'
Judgeship Act of 1984 [hereinafter cited as BAFJA].
7. Bankruptcy Code § 1329(a), (b)(1) stated:
§1329. Modification of plan after confirmation
(a) At any time after confirmation but before the completion of payments under a
plan, the plan may be modified to-
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class pro-
vided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments; or
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is provided for by
the plan, to the extent necessary to take account of any payment of such claim
other than under the plan.
(b)(1) Sections 1322(a) [required contents of plan], 1322(b) [permissive contents of
plan], and 1323(c) [pre-confirmation modification requirement regarding certain se-
cured claims] and the requirements of section 1325(a) [confirmation requirements,
including liquidation value test] apply to any modification under subsection (a) of
this section.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1329(a), (b)(1) (1982) (amended 1984). The legislative history made it clear that
the liquidation value test for the modified plan was based on the value of the bankrupts
property at the time of the modification. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 431 (1977).
(The only change made by BAFJA to this section is a provision enabling the trustee or the
holder of an allowed secured claim to seek modification of the plan after confirmation. See
infra note 97.).
8. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982) (amended 1984). Although not directly
relevant to the theme of this article, one aspect of the 1984 amendment of § 547 is worth
noting. A new preference exception was created, applicable in consumer cases, for transfers
by the bankrupt of less than $600. Bankrutpcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 547(c)(7) (West Supp.
1985). The presence of this provision, which merely benefits one set of creditors (most likely
small loan and revolving charge account creditors) at the expense of others, may indicate
that the goals of those creditor organizations which pushed for consumer credit reform were
a trifle parochial.
9. Known under the Act as Chapter XJII-Bankruptcy Act §§ 601-686, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1086 (1976) (repealed 1979).
10. Although Chapter XII proceedings did not utilize creditors' committees, they did in-
clude a meeting of creditors, and more importantly, a vote by creditors on the plan. Bank-
ruptcy Act §§ 632, 633, 652, 653, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1032, 1033, 1052, 1053 (1976) (repealed 1979).
See generally 10 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 1 25.01-.11 (L. King 14th ed. 1978). The signifi-
cance of this participation, however, was seriously questioned. Girth, The Bankruptcy Re-
form Process: Maximizing Judicial Control in Wage Earner Plans, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 51
(1977).
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ability to influence business reorganization proceedings was argua-
bly reduced.11 To at least some creditors, this seemed to create a
bankruptcy system in which only the voice of the bankrupt was
heard, and only the interests of the bankrupt served.
These issues primarily affected unsecured creditors. While se-
cured creditors had their own gripes about the Code,12 Constitu-
tional and statutory protections remained reasonably effective in
ensuring ultimate payment.13 Moreover, the formal participation of
secured creditors in some bankruptcy proceedings was actually
increased.'4
The potential abuses were real; however, what remained unclear
was whether they actually occurred with any frequency. Much of
the debate occurred in a factual vacuum; sweeping statements pro-
nounced with ex cathedra authority were rarely supported by more
than vague anecdotal evidence.' 5 The one celebrated attempt to
make an empirical study of bankruptcy and bankruptcy abuse, the
so-called "Purdue Study,"' 6 did not in detail address the question
11. The primary concern in this regard was that Chapter 11 of the Code-which amalga-
mated Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Act-made it possible for a plan of reorganization to
be confirmed by "cramdown." Cramdown, under Chapter 11, means that a plan can be con-
firmed if only one class of creditors votes to accept it, providing only that certain other
conditions are met. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA. § 1129(a)(7), (8), (10) and (b) (West Supp.
1985). Under the Act, a Chapter XI plan could only be confirmed if all classes of creditors
voted to accept it. Bankruptcy Act §§ 361, 362, 11 U.S.C. §§ 761, 762 (1976) (repealed 1979).
However, cramdown was possible under the rarely used Chapters X and XII. Bankruptcy
Act §§ 216(7), (8) and 461(11), 11 U.S.C. §§ 616(7), (8) and 861(11) (1976) (repealed 1979).
See generally 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 10.11-.17 (L. King 14th ed. 1978); 9 id. 9.03.
Cramdown, of course, reduces the power of creditors by reducing the number of creditors
who have to be satisfied with the plan for it to obtain confirmation.
12. Such as the invalidation of so-called ipso facto clauses under which insolvency or the
filing of a petition triggers default under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 363(c) (West
Supp. 1985) or the bankrupt's right under certain circumstances to grant superior liens on
the secured party's collateral. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 364(d) (West Supp. 1985).
13. For example, if secured parties so demand, their rights must be given what the Code
calls "adequate protection" (defined in Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 361 (West Supp.
1985)) for the automatic stay to remain in effect (Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 362(d)(1)
(West Supp. 1985)) or for the bankrupt to use, sell, or lease collateral (Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C.A. § 363(e), (c)(2), (4), (f) (West Supp. 1985)).
14. Under Chapter XI, "creditors" were defined as the holders of the bankrupt's un-
secured debts; "claim" and "debt" as unsecured debts. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 707
(1976) (repealed 1979). Because of this, secured creditors had no formal role in Chapter XI
proceedings. This limitation does not exist in Chapter 11, although only holders of un-
secured claims are eligible for membership on the official creditors' committee. Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1102(a) (West Supp. 1985).
15. See, e.g., supra note 5.
16. CREDrr RESEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE UNIvERSrrY,
MONOGRAPH No. 23, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY (1982) [hereinafter cited as PURDUE
STUDY].
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of whether the Code, as opposed to the Act, unduly favored debt-
ors. Although used as ammunition against the Code,1" the Purdue
Study-and its legislative progeny 1 8 focused on "income-based"
bankruptcy (that is, bankruptcy proceedings which require pay-
ments from the bankrupt's future income) as an alternative to "as-
set-based" (liquidation) bankruptcy. Because both the Act and the
Code create asset-based systems, which only require the debtor to
lhed existing assets to obtain discharge, the Purdue Study did not
. ignificantly speak to the creditors' allegations of new leniency.
In addition, many courts were sympathetic to the creditors' con-
cerns, and were glossing the Code with additional protections
against perceived abuse.' 9 Moreover, while critics of the Code were
easily able to demonstrate that the changes made to Chapter 13
made such filings more attractive than they had been under the
Act,20 they were hard-pressed to explain why Chapter 7 liquida-
17. E.g., the Purdue Study was presumably the basis for the statement of Rep. Brooks,
supra note 51, that over one billion dollars of debt was needlessly discharged each year,
since the study estimated the annual amount of unnecessarily discharged debt at
$1,100,000,000. See 1 PURDUE STUDY, supra note 16, at 88-91.
18. See, e.g., S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1982) (one of the unsuccessful contenders
in the bankruptcy reform stakes which was triggered by the invalidation of the bankruptcy
courts' jurisdictional grant). Other studies dealing extensively with the question of asset- vs.
income-based bankruptcy include Ayers, supra note 4, and Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in
Perspective, 28 U.C.LA L. REv. 953, 976-91 (1981). The Purdue Study has recently been
extensively examined and scathingly criticized for inadequate methodology, unfounded as-
sumptions, and poorly analyzed recommendations. Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, Limit-
ing Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. REv.
1091 [hereinafter cited as Analysis]; see also Sullivan, Reply: Limiting Access to Bank-
ruptcy Discharge, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1069; Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Rejoinder: Limit-
ing Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1087 [hereinafter cited as Rejoin-
der]; cf. Schuchman & Rhoper, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-Out Hearings and Other
Purposes, 56 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1982); Schuchman, The Average Bankrupt: A Description
and Analysis of 753 Personal Bankruptcy Filings in Nine States, 88 Com. L.J. 288 (1983).
In theory, the failure of Congress to follow the recommendation of the Purdue Study, and
impose mandatory income-based bankruptcy for many consumers, renders the Purdue
Study, whatever its merits, a historical curiosity. However, as will be discussed further be-
low, the Code makes possible a reading of the Chapter 7 eligibility requirements which
could lead to the gradual imposition of the income model on consumer bankruptcy.
19. Most notably by reading Chapter 13's "good faith" requirement for plan confirmation
as imposing upon the bankrupt the obligation to use his/her "best efforts" to fund the plan.
See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
20. The most significant of the "new" benefits provided Chapter 13 debtors was the ex-
pansive discharge they were granted. In most Chapter 13 proceedings, the only non-dis-
chargeable debts were (and are) those arising from alimony, maintenance, and support obli-
gations, and certain long-term debts. Bankruptcy Code, 11 US.CA §§ 1328, 1322(b)(5),
523(a) (West Supp. 1985). Compare the narrower "hardship discharge" available under
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA. § 1328(c) (West Supp. 1985), under which the normal rules of
§ 523(a) apply.
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tions had also become more popular. The naughty doctor has al-
ways been able to shed his/her debts in a "straight" bankruptcy;
the Code did nothing to make that relief more available and little
to make it more attractive. As indicated, the truth of the matter is
that American bankruptcy laws have generally used an asset-based
model rather than an income-based model; that is, bankruptcy has
generally been used to liquidate and distribute existing assets
rather than to manage future income for the benefit of creditors.21
The exceptions to this approach have traditionally been both vol-
untary and limited in scope. 2 They were merely an opportunity
for qualified bankrupts to pay more, and not a requirement that
they do so.
The explanation for the increase in liquidations given by some
creditors was only loosely related to the Code. They expressed con-
cern that the moral and social sanctions which had previously de-
terred abusive filings and encouraged payouts in excess of liquida-
tion value had largely disappeared. This process, they thought, had
been accelerated by lawyer advertising and the general "pro-
21. See generally Analysis, supra note 18, at 1097-1103; Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 976-
91; Ayers, supra note 4, at 721-23.
22. For example, proceedings under Chapters XI, XII, and XIH of the Act could only be
commenced by a voluntary petition. Bankruptcy Act §§ 321, 421, 621, 11 U.S.C. §§ 721, 821,
1021 (1976) (repealed 1979). A Chapter X proceeding could be commenced by an involun-
tary petition but that Chapter applied only to corporations, and was used rather infre-
quently, to reorganize "public" corporations. (Bankruptcy Act § 126, 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1976)
(repealed 1979)); see, e.g., H.R. RFa. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 664-65 (1977); S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 722-23 (1978). Presumably, such corporations were, by virtue of
their size, capable of being reorganized without the cooperation of any individual. Under
current law, Chapter 13 proceedings can only be commenced by a voluntary petition on the
theory that an involuntary Chapter 13 reorganization could not be made to work without
imposing "involuntary servitude" on the bankrupt. (Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 303
(West Supp. 1985)); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1977). On the other hand,
most bankrupts can now be subjected to an involuntary Chapter 11 proceeding. Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (West Supp. 1985). Curiously, it appears that there has never
been an attempt to use an involuntary Chapter 11 as a substitute for an involuntary Chap-
ter 13. In theory, at least, it would be possible to do so, since individuals can be bankrupts
under Chapter 11, and there is no express requirement that a Chapter 11 bankrupt be in
business. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 109(d) (West Supp. 1985).
It should also be noted that an involuntary Chapter 11 bankrupt cannot unilaterally con-
vert the case to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA. § 1112(a), (b) (West
Supp. 1985). However, an individual bankrupt subject to an involuntary Chapter 11 may
still be able to avoid a true income-based bankruptcy, for at least two reasons. First, it is
difficult to see how an individual who did not wish to reorganize could be forced by his/her
creditors to do so effectively. Second, Chapter 11 permits the filing of a plan that merely
liquidates the estate and distributes assets to creditors-the functional equivalent of Chap-
ter 7. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 1124(b)(4) (West Supp. 1984).
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debtor" orientation of the Code23-an orientation exemplified by
the new Chapter 13 and other protections provided to consumer
bankrupts,24 such as the substantial restrictions placed on reaffir-
mation agreements 5-and epitomized by the Code's quixotic re-
fusal to dub a bankrupt a bankrupt,26 lest the bankrupt's tender
feelings be hurt.2 7
Early attempts to translate these concerns into legislative action
were unsuccessful. Indeed, it is quite possible that the credit in-
dustry would have had to resign itself to living outside the debtor's
paradise but for the wholly unrelated Marathon Pipeline case 28
which struck down the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdictional grant and
thereby forced Congress to readdress the bankruptcy laws. What
emerged from this reassessment is the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (hereafter referred to as
"BAFJA"). 29 That statute went far beyond mere resolution of the
jurisdictional problem; it rewrote many substantive provisions of
the Code.
In part, this rewriting was to correct technical errors; to a much
greater extent, it sought to appease those groups that were dis-
mayed by the Code. Among those appeased-in part at
least-were consumer creditors. The Consumer Credit Amend-
ments3" of BAFJA address all the problems outlined above, and
most significantly, attempt to restrict access to discharge. Relief
under the Code is supposed to remain available for those truly in
financial distress; it is supposed to be made unavailable to those
who are not.3 1
This article examines those provisions of the Consumer Credit
Amendments which affect the perceived abuses of bankruptcy dis-
charge, examining the devices by which BAFJA attempts to re-
23. See generally Ayers, supra note 4, at 719-29, nn. 3-7.
24. See, e.g., Cohen & Klee, Caveat Creditor: The Consumer Debtor Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. REV. 681 (1980) (a study with far less pro-creditor bias than its title
indicates).
25. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
26. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 101(12) (West Supp. 1985).
27. "The general term debtor is used ... for ease of reference ... and as a means of
reducing the stigma connected with the term bankrupt." HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 310 (1977).
28. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
29. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 33 (1984).
30. Id. at tit. III, subtit. A.
31. See, e.g., Remarks of Rep. Brooks, 130 CONG. REc. H1812 (daily ed. March 21, 1984).
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strict access to, increase the cost of, and limit the scope of, bank-
ruptcy discharge. It takes the position that, in all probability, those
devices will have only a minor impact on the availability of bank-
ruptcy relief. On the other hand, the devices do represent what
may be the beginning of a substantial change in the structure and
philosophy of American bankruptcy law-the replacement of the
traditional asset-based liquidation bankruptcy with a mandatory
income-based reorganization bankruptcy.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO DISCHARGE-CHAPTER 7
As suggested above, some critics of the Code sought not merely
to return bankruptcy law to its pre-1978 balance between bank-
rupts and their creditors but to reshape that balance in a funda-
mental way. They asserted that many bankrupts would be able to
pay a substantial portion of their debts if they were required to
make future income, not merely present assets, available to credi-
tors.32 Critics proposed two devices to accomplish this goal. First,
those debtors who were able to pay their debts would be ineligible
for relief under Chapter 7."3 Second, Congress should rewrite
Chapter 13 to require the Chapter 13 bankrupt to pay his/her
creditors as much as possible.3 4 The combined effect of these pro-
visions would have been that debtors with few assets but signifi-
cant income would have had to choose between bankruptcy relief
that required their "best efforts" in paying creditors, and no bank-
ruptcy relief at all.
BAFJA only partially embraced this approach. As will be dis-
cussed below, Congress indeed modified Chapter 13 to impose a
"best efforts" (sub nomine "disposable income") test on the
debtor's payments." Liquidation under Chapter 7, however, seems
to remain available as an alternative, even to bankrupts who could
afford to pay more than the liquidation value of their non-exempt
assets to their creditors. Rather than requiring that such bank-
rupts use Chapter 13, the Code continues and purportedly expands
its attempt to encourage them to do so.
One of the means used to encourage the wider use of Chapter 13
32. 2 PURDUE STUDY, supra note 16, at 135-44.
33. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1981, H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1981); see also S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983).
34. H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
35. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 1325(b) (West Supp. 1985).
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is informational. Consumer debtors are now to be informed of their
alternatives to liquidation bankruptcy in two ways. First, the attor-
ney for an individual whose debts are primarily consumer debts
must now attach a declaration to the debtor's bankruptcy petition
stating that the attorney has informed the debtor that the debtor
may proceed under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the Code,
and has further explained to the debtor the relief available under
each alternative. 38 In conjunction with this, the voluntary petition
form has been amended so that those debtors whose debts are pri-
marily consumer debts must include a recital that the debtor is
aware of his/her eligibility for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, and the
provisions of each Chapter.37 Secondly, before an individual debtor
with primarily consumer debts commences a case, the clerk is re-
quired to give written notice to the debtor that informs him/her of
the various chapters of the Code under which the debtor may seek
relief.38
Unfortunately, these provisions are almost grotesquely ill-
drafted. The attorney is not formally required to tell the debtor
about Chapter 13, although the certification requirements of Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9011, which was transplanted from Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, would subject the lawyer to pen-
alties for making a false declaration. 39 More significantly, the im-
plication in the declaration that all debtors whose debts are pri-
marily consumer debts are eligible for Chapter 13 relief is wrong.
Only a debtor whose secured debts do not exceed $350,00040 and
whose unsecured debts do not exceed $100,00041 can file under
Chapter 13. While few consumers have debts in excess of those
36. BAFJA § 322; Official Bankruptcy Form No. 1, Exhibit B.
37. BAFJA § 322; Official Bankruptcy Form No. 1, 6.
38. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 342(b) (West Supp. 1985).
39. Bankruptcy Rule 9011 states, in pertinent part:
(a) Every petition, pleading, motion and other paper served or filed in a case under
the Code on behalf of a party represented by an attorney, . . shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in his individual name .... The signature... consti-
tutes a certificate by him that he has read the document; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law .... If a document is signed in
violation of this rule, the court on motion or on its own initiative, shall impose on the
person who signed it, the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ....
BANK. R. 9011 (1984).
40. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 109(e) (West Supp. 1985).
41. Id. It is possible to argue that BAFJA § 322 has implicitly changed the jurisdictional
requirements of the Code, and that all consumer debtors are now eligible for Chapter 13.
19851 853
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limits, some obviously do, and a lawyer advising such a client will
have to lie either to the client or to the court.42 The same problem
exists with the statement in the petition regarding eligibility for
Chapter 13; some consumer debtors cannot honestly say that they
know they are eligible for Chapter 13 relief, because they are not
eligible for Chapter 13 relief.
43
Moreover, neither of these provisions provides guidance to the
lawyer in determining the meaning of "primarily consumer
debts. ' 44 Nor do they provide for informing individuals whose
debts are not primarily consumer debts of the potential availability
of Chapter 13 relief. 45 Finally, and most absurdly, the Bankruptcy
Court clerk is instructed to do something that is physically impos-
sible. The clerk is to inform the debtor of alternatives before the
commencement of the case.4" However, a voluntary bankruptcy is
commenced "by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a peti-
tion. . . .,4 Obviously, barring the possession of a clairvoyance
rare among government employees, the clerk cannot possibly in-
form a voluntary bankrupt of his/her alternatives prior to the time
the bankrupt files the petition which commences the case.
These informational requirements are obviously designed to en-
sure that the debtor knows of the alternative which his/her credi-
tors presumably want him/her to adopt-payment of disposable
income rather than liquidation value of assets. Whether they will
accomplish much in this direction is unlikely. Most of this infor-
mation is probably already given to debtors, and the choice of
42. The idiocy of this result will probably lead courts to gloss the rule with an exception
for debtors who do not qualify for Chapter 13.
43. It is an interesting question whether the Supreme Court, under its rule-making power,
will be able to amend Official Form 1 to cure the absurdities created by BAFJA, 11 U.S.C. §
2075 (1982), which grants the Court this power, prohibits the Court from issuing rules that
"abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." Id. Does a change in a statutorily cre-
ated rule constitute a change in a substantive right? It is at least arguable that a rule change
which merely conforms the Official Form to the Code is not prohibited, even though the
change would override the statute.
44. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
45. Chapter 13 relief, unlike Chapter XIII relief, is available to proprietorships. See, e.g.,
Moller, It Isn't Only for Wage Earners Anymore: The Individual in Business and Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 17 Hous. L. REv. 331 (1980).
46. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 342(b) (West Supp. 1985).
47. Id. § 301. It has been suggested that difficulties created by imposing the notification
requirement on clerks can be resolved by rule changes. See, e.g., Montali, Important Bank-
ruptcy Code Changes in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
1 BANKF. PRAC. AND PROC. 8 (1984). However, as discussed supra note 43, the extent to
which the Supreme Court can correct BAFJA by rule is unclear.
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which Chapter to use is unlikely to be a factor of the debtor's igno-
rance of alternatives.
It is by no means clear, for example, that the lawyer's implied
duty to inform the client of Chapter 13 will change existing prac-
tice. What little information exists on the subject suggests that any
failure to inform clients of their alternative to liquidation is likely
to be the result of unfamiliarity with Chapter 13 or the lack of an
efficient Chapter 13 administrative structure.4 There is no indica-
tion that lawyers have been hiding Chapter 13 from their clients;
indeed, given the apparent surge in popularity of Chapter 13 after
the enactment of the Code, the reverse is likely to be true. In any
event, it is already a commonplace that the lawyer ought to discuss
options fully with the client.49 BAFJA may encourage more atten-
tion to this aspect of professional responsibility; however, it did
not create it.
Even if BAFJA has a significant impact on the amount of infor-
mation that lawyers give their clients, it still may not thereby in-
crease the popularity of Chapter 13. Just because the debtor knows
of alternatives does not mean the debtor will choose them. It is
probably true that the overwhelming majority of debtors will rely
on advice of counsel in selecting which chapter to use. It is also
probably true that most lawyers will advise most debtors to select
the option which has the least economic cost to the debtor. In gen-
eral, that option will be liquidation under Chapter 7.50
The statement added to the petition is even less likely to affect
the debtor's action. At most, it may cause the rare debtor who
reads the petition closely to ask his/her lawyer about Chapter 13, if
the lawyer has not already explained that Chapter to the debtor.
Finally, the notice from the clerk is not likely to have any effect on
the debtor at all because the case will have already been filed. 1
However, it may create some additional headaches for the clerk.52
Two other changes may have a much greater impact on the
availability of Chapter 7 discharge. The first is new section
48. Girth, supra note 10, at 55-61.
49. Indeed, this requirement is already embodied in two ethical considerations. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7, 7-8 (1979).
50. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 46.
52. The clerk will face the difficult job of determining whether an individual's debts are
primarily consumer debts, and whether the petitioner is eligible for Chapter 13.
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707(b),53 which gives the Bankruptcy Court power to dismiss "abu-
sive" filings. The second, which is procedurally if not substantively
related to the first, is amended section 521(1),54 which requires all
bankrupts to file schedules of their current income and
expenditures.
Section 707(b) permits the court "on its own motion and not at
the request. . . of any party" to dismiss a Chapter 7 case in which
the primary debts are consumer debts if it finds that granting re-
lief under Chapter 7 would be a "substantial abuse" of that Chap-
ter.5 This provision-one of the last remnants of the attempt to
impose mandatory filings under Chapter 13 on high-income debt-
ors-is rife with interpretational problems. How those problems
are resolved will determine the extent to which the post-BAFJA
Code abandons the traditional asset-based model of bankruptcy.
The first problem with the provision is, on the surface, merely
procedural. The dismissal can be made only on the court's motion
and, specifically, not at the suggestion or request of creditors or
other parties in interest.56 Yet it is likely to be either the creditors
or the trustee who are most sensitive to the abuse of Chapter 7,
and it is certainly the creditors who would most like the bankrupt
to be forced into Chapter 13 or out of bankruptcy altogether. If
creditors communicate their concern to the judge-or produce evi-
dence indicative of abuse-does this divest the court of its power
to dismiss under section 707(b)? What if the communication oc-
curs inadvertently?
On the face of it, a rule that would bar a section 707(b) dismissal
53. Bankruptcy Code states:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion and not at the request or
suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor
under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the
granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of the chapter. There
shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West Supp. 1985). It is at least worth mentioning that the develop-
ment of procedures under this provision may prove rather difficult. If a judge suspects "sub-
stantial abuse," what power does he/she have to gather evidence? If the bankrupt disputes
the judge's finding of substantial abuse, how will review be sought? If it is by regular appeal,
who is the respondent? (More importantly, who will file the respondent's brief?) If review is
by extraordinary writ, might not the trial court's discretion be given more weight than the
"presumption" in favor of granting relief? Indeed, how exactly does that presumption ap-
ply? Does the judge carry the burden of persuasion that there is substantial abuse, and
whom would he/she persuade?
54. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(1) (West Supp. 1985).
55. Id. § 707(b).
56. Id.
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whenever a creditor or the trustee made any indication of abuse to
the court would be an absurd technicality. On the other hand,
given the refusal of Congress to enact a mandatory Chapter 13, it
seems quite clear that the section represents a carefully drawn
compromise between those who wished to preserve asset liquida-
tion bankruptcies and those who did not. Congress decided not to
let creditors force debtors directly into Chapter 13. That intention
would be frustrated if they were allowed to do so indirectly by ini-
tiating the section 707(b) inquiry. This does not necessarily mean
that any reference to abusiveness by creditors bars dismissal; if the
court acts independently of the creditors, it should still be allowed
to dismiss the case.57 To ensure that the congressional intent is not
frustrated, however, the courts should impose a rebuttable pre-
sumption that whenever any creditor takes action to raise the issue
of abuse, a subsequent dismissal under section 707(b) by the Bank-
ruptcy Court is "at the request or suggestion" of the creditor and
thus improper. On the other hand, where it is demonstrated that
the creditor's action has in no way affected the court's decision, the
court should uphold the dismissal. 8
A second question concerns the meaning of "primarily consumer
debts." There are at least three ways in which this requirement
could be read: number of debts, quantity of debts, or purpose of
filing. The first would focus solely on the number of consumer and
non-consumer obligations the bankrupt has, without regard to the
relative size of those obligations. The second would look solely to
the overall amount of consumer and non-consumer debts. For ex-
ample, if a bankrupt had twenty-five consumer obligations total-
ling $6,000 and three non-consumer obligations totalling $75,000,
the first test would treat the debtor as one who has "primarily con-
sumer debts"; the second would not.
Neither of these numerical tests focuses appropriately on the
57. Unfortunately, legislative history is not especially helpful. The Senate Report on
S.445, from which proposal the final version of § 707(b) was derived, states that-
Under this provision, the court may not dismiss a case in response to a request or
suggestion from any party in interest, nor may a party in interest make such a re-
quest or suggestion. Instead, the case may be dismissed only where the court, acting
independently on its own motion, finds substantial abuse ....
S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1983). This does not even address the issue of
whether an independent dismissal by a court after a request or suggestion by a creditor is
permissible. See In re Christian, 13 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 313 (D.N.J. 1985); 130 CONG.
REc. H1811 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
58. These problems may be resolved by the rules the Supreme Court is supposed to issue
defining procedures for § 707(b) dismissals. BAFJA § 320.
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purpose of section 707(b), which was to avoid the abusive filing of
consumer bankruptcy. Abusive, in this context, seems to relate to
the utilization of Chapter 7 to avoid paying consumer debts. In-
deed, it is quite arguable that there is no need for section 707(b) to
avoid abusive discharge of business debts because a business
debtor can be forced into an involuntary reorganization; 59 a con-
sumer debtor cannot.6 0 Since the purpose of the provision is to
compensate for the creditors' inability to force into Chapter 13 a
consumer debtor who is abusively using Chapter 7 to discharge his/
her debts, the proper focus of the inquiry should be on the purpose
of the debtor in filing bankruptcy. If the primary purpose of the
bankruptcy is to discharge consumer debts, then section 707(b) is
applicable. The number and amount of the bankrupt's consumer
obligations are of course relevant to this inquiry, but should not be
dispositive. The slight case law on this point is somewhat support-
ive of this interpretation.6 1
By far the most significant question of interpretation is the
meaning of the phrase, "substantial abuse." It can also be inter-
preted in at least three ways: narrowly, to apply to a few, clearly
illegitimate filings; broadly, to apply to any Chapter 7 filing by one
who could manage more than mere liquidation, or somewhere in
between. A narrow interpretation of substantial abuse would limit
section 707(b) dismissals to those cases in which the bankrupt ac-
ted fraudulently, failed to comply with the requirements of the
Code, or failed to comply with orders of the court. A broad inter-
pretation, on the other hand, would treat as abusive any Chapter 7
filing by a bankrupt who could make substantial payments on his/
her existing debts. The latter reading would of course slip a
mandatory Chapter 13 into the Code, because it would force bank-
rupts who could fund a Chapter 13 plan either to do so or to forego
bankruptcy.
59. See supra note 22.
60. Id.
61. In re Bryant, 47 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984), rejected the argument that "pri-
marily consumer debts" means that the amount of consumer debts must exceed the amount
of non-consumer debts. It held that whether or not a case involves "primarily consumer
debts" depends on all the facts and circumstances, and that the court can consider the
relative number of consumer debts as well as the total amount. The court further deter-
mined that the debtor's home mortgage was a consumer obligation, and thus should have
been classified as a consumer debt. Id. at 26. While the court did not speak in terms of
intent, it seems clear that the bankrupt's purpose in filing bankruptcy was to obtain relief
from consumer obligations.
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The narrow reading is far more consonant with Congress' rejec-
tion of mandatory Chapter 13 proceedings. On the other hand, it
could render section 707(b) practically meaningless. Even without
section 707(b), the court probably has the power to dismiss cases
for fraud, for failure to comply with the Code, or for failure to
comply with court orders, either under section 707(a) or other pro-
visions.6 2 Moreover, there is at least some suggestion in the revised
requirements for the petition that the broad reading is correct. As
noted above, the consumer debtor is now obligated to file schedules
of income and expenses.63 There is no earthly reason for imposing
such a requirement in a Chapter 7 consumer case unless the court
is supposed to use those schedules to determine whether or not the
bankrupt has enough income to pay a substantial portion of his/
her debts. The only time the court has any reason to make such a
determination is in conjunction with its determination under sec-
tion 707(b) of the propriety of the debtor's decision to file under
Chapter 7.
The very limited case law under section 707(b) is inconclusive at
best. In re Bryant 4 contains language which supports the broad
interpretation; it states that when a Chapter 7 is filed not because
of the bankrupt's unemployment or inability to repay creditors,
but merely because of a desire to "shuck a couple of his debts," the
congressional purpose underlying the Code is frustrated.65 On the
other hand, the facts of the case are more in line with the narrow
reading of section 707(b). The petitioner lied about his financial
position and his current expenses.6 6 His petition was fraudulent
under any standard, and could undoubtedly have been dismissed
with or without section 707(b). Practically the only other reported
case on this issue, In re Wright,67 is primarily concerned with pe-
nalizing an attorney for failure to provide his bankrupt clients with
62. 11 U.S.CA § 707(a) (West Supp. 1985); see, e.g., In re Richards, 43 Bankr. 554
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Import Toy Sales, Inc., 41 Bankr. 784 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984);
cf. In re Jennings, 31 Bankr. 378 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
63. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
64. 47 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1984).
65. Id. at 24.
66. In Bryant, the debtor intentionally failed to list seven or eight credit cards upon
which he was making payments. Further, while the debtor said he did not list them because
the amounts owed were insignificant, he allocated $400 per month for payments on those
cards in his expenses schedule. The court also found that the debtor's estimates for food,
medical and automobile expenses were grossly excessive. The debtor's actions were charac-
terized as a fraud on the court. Id. at 25.
67. 48 Bankr. 172 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985).
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adequate representation. The court, however, notes that the
debtor's income and expenses statement "reflected a disposable in-
come of $553 per month." Apparently on the basis of this state-
ment, the court issued a "Notice of Possible Dismissal of Case for
'Substantial Abuse' Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)." 68 It may well
be that, in the opinion of at least one bankruptcy judge, anyone
who has income of $553 per month over and above bare living ex-
penses is presumptively ineligible for Chapter 7.
Perhaps the best solution to the substantial abuse conundrum is
to take the middle position between the broad and narrow readings
of this requirement. Under this middle ground approach, substan-
tial abuse would exist in either of two circumstances. The first
would be where the bankrupt filed a fraudulent petition or sched-
ules. The second would be where the the bankrupt clearly had the
ability to pay creditors an amount greatly in excess of the liquida-
tion value of his/her assets without significant hardship. This
would breathe life into section 707(b) without destroying the dis-
tinction Congress sought to preserve between asset liquidation
bankruptcies under Chapter 7 and income bankruptcies under
Chapter 13. Bankrupts who could pay somewhat more than liqui-
dation value, or who could pay substantially more, but only with
significant hardship, could choose either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.
Those who could not pay more would be unable to use Chapter
13.69 Those who could easily pay much more would be forced to
choose between Chapter 13 or no bankruptcy relief at all.Y° The
68. Id. at 173.
69. Since a Chapter 13 plan cannot be confirmed unless the court finds that "the debtor
will be able to make all payments under the plan. . . ." (Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA §
1325(a)(6) (West Supp. 1985)), those who do not have enough disposable income to pay
their creditors more than liquidation value cannot use Chapter 13.
70. Some limited support for this can be found in the legislative history to § 202(c) of the
unenacted Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983, which was a provision identical
to § 707(b). The Senate Report on the 1983 Act states:
This provision represents a balancing of two interests. It preserves the fundamental
concept embodied in our bankruptcy laws that debtors who cannot meet debts as
they come due should be able to relinquish non-exempt property in exchange for a
fresh start. At the same time, however, it upholds creditors' interests in obtaining
repayment where such repayment would not be a burden.
Crushing debt burdens and severe financial problems place enormous strains on
borrowers and their families. Family life, personal emotional health, or work produc-
tivity often suffers. By enabling individuals who cannot meet their debts to start a
new life, unburdened with debts they cannot pay, the bankruptcy laws allow troubled
borrowers to become productive members of their communities. Nothing in this bill
denies such borrowers with unaffordable debt burdens bankruptcy relief under Chap-
ter 7. However, if a debtor can meet his debts without difficulty as they come due,
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net result, of course, would be that section 707(b)'s restriction on
access to discharge would affect very few cases.
III. INCREASED COST OF DISCHARGE-CHAPTER 13
While the significance of BAFJA's limitations on Chapter 7 dis-
charge may be open to question, the same is not true of BAFJA's
increase in the cost of a Chapter 13 discharge. Chapter 13, which
began life as the "wage earner plan" under the Bankruptcy Act,71
was greatly expanded in scope by the Code.7 2 More significantly,
Chapter 13 was redesigned in an effort to attract debtors to use a
voluntary, income-based bankruptcy by giving bankrupts who
chose Chapter 13 significant advantages over those who used
Chapter 7. Chief among these advantages were the ability of the
bankrupt to retain his/her existing assets in exchange for making
payments to creditors under the plan of arrangement, and the
grant of a much wider discharge than that afforded other bank-
rupts. In most Chapter 13 proceedings, all the debts made non-
dischargeable in Chapter 7 and 11 proceedings by section 523,
other than those for alimony, maintenance and support, are
discharged.7
The perceived problem with Chapter 13 was that it did not exact
a sufficient quid pro quo for these additional benefits."4 Read liter-
ally, the original version of Chapter 13 required only that the
bankrupt pay his/her creditors the liquidation value of his/her as-
sets.75 In other words, the payments made over the life of the plan,
when reduced to present value, only had to equal what would have
use of Chapter 7 would represent a substantial abuse.
S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 53-54 (1983) (emphasis added). It is also worth noting
that mere ability to pay debts is not viewed as sufficient cause to permit voluntary dismissal
of a bankruptcy petition. See In re Green, 49 Bankr. 7 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984).
71. Bankruptcy Act, §§ 601-86, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1976) (repealed 1979).
72. Primarily, the Chapter was made available to all individuals, not just wage earners,
who have (1) regular income, (2) unsecured debts of less than $100,000, and (3) secured
debts of less than $350,000. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 109(e) (West Supp. 1985).
73. See supra note 20.
74. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1983).
75. Prior to BAFJA, the only minimum payment for Chapter 13s contained in the Code
was that found in § 1325(a)(4), which stated that a plan could be confirmed only if-
the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the
plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that
would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter
7 of this title on such date ....
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982). But see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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been yielded by a Chapter 7 liquidation. This, of course, is the so-
called "best interest of creditors" standard long familiar to parties
to Chapter 1176 (nee Chapter XI") proceedings. That standard has
never been particularly controversial in business reorganizations,
although it became so in Chapter 13 reorganizations, for at least
three reasons.
First, of course, was the wider Chapter 13 discharge. It seemed
unfair at best, unwise at worst, to grant discharge of those debts
labeled heinous by section 523 in exchange for payments no larger
than those made on ordinary debts. Second, though of far less sig-
nificance, was the perceived unfairness of giving the bankrupt the
right to retain his/her assets for a liquidation payout.18 Third, the
bankrupt's ability to freely modify the plan 79 should his/her ability
to pay be reduced meant that creditors were not even assured of
receiving the liquidation value of the bankrupt's original assets.
The modified plan was also subject to the best interest of creditors
test, but the bankrupt's assets were revalued as of the time of the
modification. 0 The bankrupt would thus have to pay only the re-
vised liquidation value, and if the value of his/her assets had de-
clined since the original plan, would be able to cut payments to
creditors accordingly.
To these objections should be added a fourth which was not
clearly articulated, but to some extent lay at the root of the other
three. Unlike every other reorganization proceeding under both the
Act and the Code, Chapter 13 gives creditors no formal role in the
formulation of the plan."' There is no creditor's committee and no
requirement that creditors approve the plan. Although creditors
retain some significant tools to encourage the debtor to be ac-
comodating, s2 those tools existing prior to BAFJA were cumber-
some and uncertain, especially for unsecured creditors.
76. To be precise, the Bankruptcy Code generally requires that creditors "receive or re-
tain ... property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the
amount that [would be received or retained] if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7
. " 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1985).
77. Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C. § 366(2) (1976) (repealed 1979).
78. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1983).
79. See supra note 7.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 10.
82. For example, all creditors retained (and still retain) the right to object to confirmation
under the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982)) and the right of the holder of a se-
cured claim to seek modification of the automatic stay was unaffected. Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (amended 1984).
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Congress deleted formal creditor participation on the plausible
ground that the small size of Chapter 13 proceedings discouraged
effective creditor participation anyway; creditors under Chapter
XIII rarely bothered to exercise their rights because the costs of
participation in the proceeding were disproportionate to the bene-
fits obtained.8 3 Although it seems to be true that creditor partici-
pation was rare, the degree to which it was irrelevant is debata-
ble.84 While it is reasonably clear that Congress assumed that
debtors would, even without the prod of creditor oversight, gener-
ally produce plans that provided for substantial payouts, it is
equally clear that this did not happen-or at least did not happen
universally. That, in turn, was the primary cause for dissatisfaction
with Chapter 13.
What Congress overlooked in deleting formal creditor participa-
tion from Chapter 13 was that the threat of a creditor veto, even if
rarely exercised, inevitably induced most debtors to propose rea-
sonably satisfactory plans. Although Chapter 11 and Chapter 13
have exactly the same minimum payout requirement-best inter-
est of creditors-in Chapter 11 the standard is not controversial.
The reason is simple. "Best interest of creditors" in Chapter 11 is
only the minimum amount the bankrupt can pay if its creditors
will let it. The Chapter 11 bankrupt must bargain with its credi-
tors for permission not to liquidate. The only thing the Chapter 11
bankrupt has to bargain with is payment in excess of liquidation
value,8 5 since, obviously, the creditors will get that even if the reor-
ganization fails. This bargaining almost always produces the prom-
ise (if not necessarily the reality) of additional payments. By limit-
ing (and indeed virtually eliminating) this bargaining process,
Chapter 13 took away one of the bankrupt's greatest incentives to
offer creditors more than an installment liquidation.6
Prior to BAFJA, many courts addressed this problem by impos-
ing a "best efforts" standard.8 7 Chapter 13 required (and still re-
83. See supra note 10.
84. The mere possibility of creditor intervention may have been responsible for the fact
that, in general, Chapter XIII plans proposed substantial payouts. With regard to the size of
proposed Chapter XIII payouts, see Girth, supra note 10, at 57-58.
85. Indeed, this is all the parties are bargaining over even when they discuss payment
terms, since the terms (e.g., length of plan, funding of plan, collateral) are important only
insofar as they increase or decrease the amount of money the creditors will ultimately get.
86. Some other incentives remain, such as a sense of moral obligation or a desire to stay
on good terms with individual creditors.
87. See generally 5 CoLLER ON BANKRUPTcY 1325.01[2] [C], at 1325-28 (L. King 15th ed.
1984).
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quires), as a condition of plan confirmation, that the plan be pro-
posed in "good faith."88  This was widely-although not
universally-interpreted to require that the debtor pay as much to
his/her creditors as he/she reasonably could. While this reading of
"good faith" was clearly incorrect from a historical standpoint,89
and conveniently ignored Congress' refusal to enact an express best
efforts standard,e0 it did serve the purpose of more clearly distin-
guishing Chapter 13 from Chapter 7. It required that something
more than liquidation value be paid if something more than liqui-
dation value were available.
The Code's new approach is slightly different. Under BAFJA, a
Chapter 13 debtor need only meet the liquidation value standard if
neither the trustee nor any unsecured creditor objects to the
plan.91 In other words, if those parties acquiesce, the debtor can
still use Chapter 13 for installment liquidations. Conversely, if ob-
jection to the plan is made, the debtor must either pay the claim of
the objecting party in full or fund the plan with all of his/her pro-
jected disposable income for the three years which succeed confir-
mation of the plan. 2
Utilization of the disposable income standard has several effects
on Chapter 13 proceedings. First, it obviously increases the mini-
88. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982).
89. See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 1325.01[2][C] (L. King 15th ed. 1984).
90. Congress had at least one chance to do so. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1981,
S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 128[b] (1981).
91. Bankruptcy Code § 1325(b)(1) states in full:
If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation
of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of
the plan-
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such
claim is not less than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be
received in the three-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is
due under the plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.
11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
92. Id. Two minor problems are worth mentioning. First, the Code manages to be marvel-
ously ambiguous about what the bankrupt must do if only the trustee objects to confirma-
tion. Since the trustee does not have an allowed unsecured claim, and thus cannot be paid
in full, the bankrupt must presumably meet the disposable income standard. Second, it is
not certain that the disposable income standard wholly displaces case law under the good
faith/best efforts standard. This could be significant to a court willing to consider, as some
pre-BAFJA courts did, the possibility of requiring full or very substantial payment of § 523
obligations as a condition of discharge, without regard to the bankrupt's means. See, e.g., In
re Rimgale, No. 80 C 4862 (N.D. M11. 1981), vacated, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982).
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mum payout required for confirmation of many Chapter 13 plans.
Second, it requires the court to conduct an inquiry into the bank-
rupt's personal financial affairs-an inquiry some judges may be
unwilling, and others unable, to make. Third, it may paradoxically
discourage many debtors from filing under Chapter 13 rather than
Chapter 11. Finally, it may revive, through backdoor means, direct
creditor participation in the formulation of the Chapter 13 plan.
It should be obvious that, if creditors' perceptions of the fre-
quency of abusive Chapter 13 filings are accurate, the "disposable
income" standard will increase the costs of a Chapter 13 discharge
to a significant number of bankrupts. It can probably be assumed
that unsecured creditors will almost routinely object to any plan
that does not provide for a very substantial payout, thereby trig-
gering the disposable income standard. (The traditional apathy of
creditors in Chapter 13 proceedings, however, may sharply limit
the number of objections in smaller cases.) The disposable income
standard, in turn, will require payments that will be far in excess
of liquidation value, at least if the bankrupt meets the high debt/
low asset/high income profile discussed above.
Under the amended Code, "disposable income" is defined as in-
come in excess of that which is reasonably necessary for the sup-
port or maintenance of the bankrupt and his/her dependents. 3 In
addition, the disposable income standard is based, not on current
disposable income, but on a projection of the bankrupt's future
disposable income during the three years following the commence-
ment of the plan. 4 Thus, the court is required to estimate both the
bankrupt's future income and the bankrupt's future "reasonably
necessary" expenses to determine the adequacy of payments under
the proposed plan.9 5 Each of these calculations is fraught with un-
certainty. If the bankrupt is not employed under a long-term con-
tract, his/her income may fluctuate widely over the three year pe-
93. Bankruptcy Code § 1325(b)(2) reads in full:
For purposes of this subsection, "disposable income" means income which is received
by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be expended-
(A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
or
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures neces-
sary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business.
11 U.S.CA- § 1325(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
94. Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
95. It is also worth noting that, when dealing with a proprietorship, the court must calcu-
late as well the "necessary" expenditures of the business. Id. § 1325(b)(2)(B). Congress was
remarkably discrete about the difference between "reasonably necessary" and "necessary."
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riod.s6 Indeed, some bankrupts have the ability to manipulate their
income. Can a bankrupt deliberately choose to earn less than he/
she is capable of earning during the plan period? Can a bankrupt
lawyer elect to spend three years earning karma at Legal Aid
rather than luchre on Wall Street? The disposable income stan-
dard encourages such manipulation and gives the bankrupt no eco-
nomic incentive to maximize income because everything the bank-
rupt earns above his/her "reasonably necessary" expenses goes to
creditors anyway.9 7
The debtor's expenses may be equally difficult to measure. Obvi-
ously, unexpected illness could radically change the expense side of
the ledger-but how should the court deal with planned discretion-
ary increases in expenses? For example, suppose a debtor plans to
marry or have a child during the plan period-can the court take
this expectation into account, in calculating disposable income? In-
deed, can the court prohibit the debtor from undertaking such ex-
penses? Just as the debtor has no incentive to maximize income
during the plan period, he/she has no incentive to minimize
expenses.
While the uncertainties of future income and expenses will make
the disposable income standard difficult to apply in some cases, a
more serious problem is the degree to which it invites the court to
undertake a paternalistic restructuring of the debtor's lifestyle. As
noted, the court may have to decide whether having a child is a
"reasonably necessary" expense. How about sending the child to
college?98 These hypotheticals are not as extreme as they may ap-
pear at first blush; indeed, one "best efforts" case decided that, to
obtain confirmation of his plan, the debtor would have to forego
96. This may be an especially difficult task if the bankrupt is a proprietor, since the busi-
ness may well have almost no history of prior profits from which the court could calculate
future income.
97. See generally Analysis, supra note 18, at 1133-35. The creditors' newly acquired abil-
ity under the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.CA § 1329 (West Supp. 1985)) to force modification
of the plan after confirmation will only make this problem worse. If the bankrupt does man-
age to increase his/her income beyond that which the court initially estimated, the creditors
have the power to force the bankrupt to increase payments under the plan. Thus, the sensi-
ble Chapter 13 bankrupt will either decline opportunities to increase income or attempt to
hide his/her success in doing so.
It should also be noted that any too flagrant abuse of the ability to increase or decrease
income at will might run afoul of the "good faith" requirement of 11 U.S.CA. § 1325(a)(3)
(West Supp. 1985).
98. At least one pre-BAFJA "best efforts" case indicates that the answer is no. See In re
Jolly, 13 Bankr. 123, 125 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981) (money saved for children's education
properly available to creditors).
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tithing his church and pay that money to his creditors instead. 99
While the choice between God and Mammon is one many Ameri-
cans might make with ease, forcing the debtor to choose the latter
raises troubling questions. 100 If religious faith must yield to the
compelling necessity to pay, then a fortiori any expenditure be-
yond that needed to sustain a very modest way of life is at risk. If
a bankrupt cannot tithe, by what right can he/she take a vacation,
rent an $800 per month apartment if a $200 per month apartment
is available, or take night courses to complete a college degree?' 01
To some degree at least, Chapter 13 has been transformed into a
guardianship proceeding in which the court plays a dour trustee to
the bankrupt's rakish spendthrift. 0 2 Some courts will not be
pleased with the role. Others may be ill-equipped to handle it in
non-routine cases. Courts are not generally noted for their financial
acumen, and they may find it quite difficult to apply the disposa-
ble income standard to such situations as the financial affairs of a
small business.
It is also worth noting that, in making the disposable income de-
termination, the courts will face an especially delicate task in deal-
99. In re Breckenridge, 12 Bankr. 159 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
100. It raises first amendment questions, if nothing else.
101. Such a limitation, although indicated by In re Jolly, 13 Bankr. at 123, is irrational
because such further education might increase both the bankrupt's income and his/her abil-
ity to pay.
102. Several commentators, reviewing the pre-BAFJA proposals for a mandatory Chapter
13, focused on the difficulty of administration as one of the central problems created. See
Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 U.C.LA L.
REV. 327, 356-57 (1982); LoPucki, Encouraging Repayment under Chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 18 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 347, 369-72 (1981); Rejoinder, supra note 18, at 1098-99;
see also Analysis, supra note 18, at 1136 n.283:
[O]n February 14, 1983, "The CBS Evening News with Dan Rather," featured a story
suggesting that bankruptcy abuse is increasing. The attention grabbing examples
were Rick Upchurch and Harvey Martin, professional football players each earning
over $100,000 per year .... Aside from the obvious fact that these bankruptcies are
hardly typical, the reporter's assumption that they "could pay" missed the point
which their circumstances actually revealed. The two aging athletes almost certainly
could not have paid as much as half their enormous debts during the remainder of
their professional careers, after which they might well have relatively modest in-
comes. Even in the immediate future, the players' large incomes depend on constant
acceptance of brutal conditioning and pain, and on achieving a high level of perform-
ance. Would the bankruptcy judge, sweatshirted and bewhistled, decide if Martin was
"dogging it" in order to avoid enduring great suffering for the benefit of his creditors?
Id.
Somewhat naively, Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook elsewhere assume that judges would be
"horrified" to make the types of decisions required by a disposable income standard. Id. at
1141. At least some of the "best efforts" cases indicate otherwise. See supra notes 98-99.
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ing with the very type of debtor at whom the standard is aimed.
The high-income/low-asset bankrupt may well be used to a com-
fortable, or even extravagant, lifestyle. To the extent the court
forces him/her to trim back, it discourages him/her from using
Chapter 13. To the extent it does not do so, the court is placing the
lower-income Chapter 13 debtor at a relative disadvantage.
This suggests the most serious problem with the disposable in-
come standard. Its effect may be precisely opposite to that in-
tended. Except for those debtors who need the very broad Chapter
13 discharge, there is little or no economic incentive to choose
Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7.103 Even some debtors who have
obligations which are not dischargeable under Chapter 7 will
choose liquidation because the cost of meeting the disposable in-
come requirement will exceed the cost of paying the section 523
obligations. Moreover, the broader discharge available under Chap-
ter 13 is granted only upon completion of the plan, or of the plan
as modified. 104 Obviously, even the debtor who might benefit from
Chapter 13 is subject to a significant risk that discharge will not be
granted, a risk that arises in part from the difficulty of complying
with the disposable income standard. 10 5 Thus, anyone who under-
takes to pay substantial amounts to his/her creditors under Chap-
ter 13, but who is unsuccessful in his/her attempt, might lose the
benefits of both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.
The courts have significant power to ameliorate this risk. The
bankrupt is given broad power to amend the plan if it proves in-
feasible,106 and the courts have to date been fairly generous in in-
terpreting this power, at least where there has been some bona fide
change in the bankrupt's economic circumstances. 107 In addition,
103. There are of course non-economic incentives for those who wish to meet moral obli-
gations, and economic incentives for those who wish to retain good relations with certain
creditors. However, either of those two goals can be easily accomplished without reorganiz-
ing under Chapter 13, either by making voluntary repayment or by reaffirmation. If a bank-
rupt only wishes to pay a few of his/her creditors more than liquidation value, it makes
more sense to make separate arrangements with them than to bear the burden of paying
extra to all creditors.
104. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 1328(a) (West Supp. 1985). While § 1328(b) permits
the unsuccessful reorganizer to obtain a "hardship discharge," that discharge does not re-
lieve it of § 523(a) obligations. Id. § 1328(c).
105. Even before BAFJA, the failure rate of Chapter 13 (or, more precisely, Chapter XIH)
plans was said to be 50%. Countryman, Legal Relief: Straight Bankruptcy and Wage
Earner Plans, 26 Bus. LAW. 933, 939 (1971). There do not appear to be any reliable figures
for the Chapter 13 failure rate under the Code.
106. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA. § 1329(a) (West Supp. 1985).
107. See, e.g., In re Costen, 39 Bankr. 29, 31 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984) (§ 1329 "contem-
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the court has the power to permit the bankrupt to extend the plan
period to five years for "cause."' 08 Such an extension would not
increase the minimum payout required, which is set at three years'
disposable income without regard to the length of the plan. 09 The
limited case law has taken a very narrow view of cause. 1 0 It may
now, however, be appropriate to rethink this; if bankrupts are able
to spread their disposable income obligation over a five, rather
than a three, year period, Chapter 13 will become much more
attractive.
What the courts cannot significantly affect, however, is the sub-
stantial increase in the cost of Chapter 13 discharge. This increase
will surely discourage many debtors from filing Chapter 13-unless
the courts force them out of Chapter 7 by a broad reading of sec-
tion 707. It may also have another unintended effect. Since any
unsecured creditor can impose the disposable income standard on
the bankrupt merely by objecting to the plan, it is possible, in rela-
tively large Chapter 13 proceedings, that the bankrupt will attempt
to reach some accomodation with his/her creditors prior to filing
the plan. The creditors' primary bargaining chip would be their
power to trigger the disposable income standard. The bankrupt's
chip would be an option to convert to Chapter 7."' Since the pay-
out could not possibly be more than the bankrupt's disposable in-
come or less than the liquidation value of his/her assets, such ac-
comodations would tend to produce what bargaining under
Chapter 11 produces-a payout less than the former but more
than the latter."2 The small size of the typical Chapter 13 proceed-
plates financial difficulties which may arise following confirmation, as well as unforeseen
circumstances relating to the uncertainty of many debtors' incomes, emergency expenses,
and other individual problems."); In re Davis, 34 Bankr. 319 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983) (bank-
rupt need not show "grievous" change in circumstances to modify Chapter 13 plan).
108. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 1322(c) (West Supp. 1985).
109. Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
110. What little case law there is seems to be addressed more to the courts' dislike of the
liquidation value standard than the desirability of an extended plan. In re Price, 20 Bankr.
253 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) (cause to extend to five years not shown when sole purpose of
extension was to improve debtor's chance of reorganizing and dividend to creditors would
only be five percent); In re Stein, 18 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (desire to make
100% payout sufficient cause to extend time beyond three years); In re Purdy, 10 Bankr.
902, 906 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (inability to pay secured creditors in three years cause to
extend plan to four years).
111. Of course, the value of this chip will depend upon the courts' reading of section
707(b). Curiously, it is arguable that § 707(b) does not apply to conversions, since it speaks
in terms of cases "filed . .. under this Chapter." Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 707(b)
(West Supp. 1985).
112. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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ing has discouraged such bargaining in the past,113 and will pre-
sumably continue to do so in most cases. However, some Chapter
13 actions (especially those involving sole proprietorships in service
industries) can involve substantial sums of money.114 At least in
those proceedings, haggling over the plan-and perhaps even some
form of creditors' committee-may return.
IV. LIMITATION ON THE SCOPE OF DISCHARGE-"LUXURY GOODS"
One limitation on the consumer debtor's access to discharge
which will primarily affect Chapter 7 proceedings" 5 is found in
new section 523(a)(2)(C). This provision creates a presumption
that consumer debts aggregating more than $500 owed by the
debtor to a single creditor for the acquisition of "luxury goods or
services" within forty days before the order for relief are non-dis-
chargeable." 6 Also presumed non-dischargeable are debts arising
from consumer credit advances under an open-end credit plan if
such advances exceed $1,000 and were obtained within twenty days
of the order for relief."7
These provisions are part of section 523(a)(2)(A), which makes
debts incurred by false pretenses or actual fraud non-dischargea-
113. See supra note 10.
114. The preparation of a plan by, and the activities of, a business that is just within the
maximum limit of $100,000 in unsecured debt and has sufficient income to make a substan-
tial distribution on that debt may well be worth monitoring by creditors during both the
formulation of the plan and the plan period. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. This
is especially true if the business is a service business with few assets because the creditors
would not have significant assets to fall back on should the plan abort or be sabotaged by
the bankrupt.
115. Indeed, almost exclusively, because the debts made presumptively non-dischargeable
would be discharged upon successful completion of a Chapter 13 plan. See Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a) (West Supp. 1985).
116. Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2)(C) reads in full:
[F]or purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer debts owed to a sin-
gle creditor and aggregating more than $500 for "luxury goods or services" [sic] in-
curred by an individual debtor on or within forty days before the order for relief
under this title, or cash advances aggregating more than $1,000 that are extensions of
consumer credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on
or within twenty days before the order for relief under this title, are presumed to be
nondischargeable; "luxury goods or services" do not include goods or services reason-
ably acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor; an extension of consumer credit under an open end credit plan is to be de-
fined for purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act (15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.).
Id. § 523(a)(2)(C).
117. Id.
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ble. n 8 Thus, the substance of the provisions is that the debtor is
presumed to have defrauded his/her creditors in the acquisition of
the goods, services, or cash advances. The provisions appear to
have been intended to prevent a debtor from enjoying one last
spree just prior to bankruptcy.11 e
These provisions are also loaded with serious ambiguities. 20
What in the world are "luxury goods or services"? The Code
grudgingly defines what they are not: they are not goods or services
reasonably acquired for the support or maintenance of the bank-
rupt or the bankrupt's dependents. 2' This definition, however,
leaves the original ambiguity virtually unscathed. On the surface, a
debtor who buys a Jaguar or a Mercedes just before bankruptcy is
buying a "luxury good"-but what if the debtor has always bought
Jaguars or Mercedes? Is the standard based on what type of goods
or services the debtor usually buys? This approach seems to fit the
policy against pre-bankruptcy sprees, but it significantly favors
well-to-do bankrupts, and ignores the fact that free-spending hab-
its may have brought him/her to bankruptcy court in the first
place. Is the standard based on what is "luxurious" to the average
consumer? This seriously disadvantages the affluent bankrupt
whose spending habits were not changed just prior to bankruptcy.
118. Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2)(A),(B) read in full:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debt-
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit,
to the extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a state-
ment respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(B) use of a statement in writing-
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such money, prop-
erty, services, or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive.
Id. § 523(a)(2)(A),(B).
119. See S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1983) (discussing § 202(a) of the Omni-
bus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983, which was a predecessor of § 523(a)(2)(C)).
120. Not to mention some of the most cumbersome and prolix English ever to appear in
print. This provision is a mere fraction of an execrable thousand-word sentence which ap-
pears, like so much of the Code, to be poorly translated from the Japanese. Indeed, the
drafters of the Code may now be able to claim the record for bad writing long held by James
Fenimore Cooper. See generally Twain, Fenimore Cooper's Literary Offenses, in 1 L.
TEACHER, THE UNABRIDGED MARK TwAIN 1241 (1976).
121. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 523(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1985).
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By far the most difficult and subtle interpretation problem re-
lates to the content of the spending spree presumption. What ex-
actly must the bankrupt do or demonstrate to avoid the penalty of
non-dischargeability? Since the statute creates the presumption
that the goods, services, or loans were obtained under false pre-
tenses, what are the "false pretenses" which the bankrupt is pre-
sumed to have used to get them? Is it implied misrepresentation of
solvency, of willingness to pay, of ability to pay, or of having no
intention to go bankrupt? The content of the presumption will
have a substantial effect on what the bankrupt must show to rebut
it. For example, if the presumed lie concerns solvency, the bank-
rupt would have to produce evidence of assets and liabilities on the
date of the credit extension. If the lie relates to ability to pay, the
issue to be resolved will be the adequacy of the now-bankrupt
debtor's cash flow on the date of the purchase. In either event,
would it be sufficient for the bankrupt to show that he/she did not
intentionally make the misrepresentation? Moreover, what eviden-
tiary burden(s) does the presumption shift? Is it sufficient for the
bankrupt to produce some evidence that there was no fraud or
false pretenses? Or must the bankrupt persuade the court of this?
The former standard is the more widely used definition of a pre-
sumption, 122 but it may make section 523(a)(2)(A) virtually mean-
ingless, since a disingenuous bankrupt could easily deny that he/
she intended to defraud his/her creditors. 123
One further problem which may occasionally arise is the treat-
ment of involuntary debtors under Chapter 7. If a consumer debtor
has been involuntarily pushed into bankruptcy, should the pre-
sumption apply? Read literally, section 523 (a)(2)(C) would say it
does, since no distinction is drawn between voluntary or involun-
tary bankruptcy. In part, the answer to this question will depend
upon the content of the presumption. If the presumption is that
the debtor was fraudulently misrepresenting his/her willingness or
ability to pay, then involuntary petitions should not be treated dif-
ferently than voluntary petitions. If the presumption is that the
122. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 301.
123. There is not much help in the case law. See, e.g., In re Barnacle, 44 Bankr. 50
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (Under § 523(a)(2)(A), the creditor must prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the debtor obtained property by representations that the debtor knew
to be false or that were made with a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.). It can at
least be argued that the normally heavy burden imposed on the creditor to demonstrate
non-dischargeability should lead to a correspondingly slight burden on the debtor to rebut
the presumption.
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debtor was fraudulently misrepresenting his/her intentions regard-
ing bankruptcy, then the presumption should not ordinarily apply.
The import of this latter interpretation is that the debtor de-
frauded creditors because he/she knew at the time the bills were
incurred that he/she would soon be filing bankruptcy. It is rather
difficult to see how a debtor can be presumed to know that credi-
tors will file an involuntary petition against him/her in the near
future. While it would not necessarily require an impossible feat of
precognition to obtain such knowledge, the logic of the presump-
tion fits this situation awkardly at best.124
As is true with the other limitations on discharge, section
523(a)(2)(A) presupposes widespread abuse of bankruptcy law by
consumer debtors. Unlike the provisions contained in sections
707(b) and 1325(b)(1), however, section 523(a)(2)(A) benefits a
class of creditors who lack even a colorable claim to special protec-
tion by the Code. The sellers of "luxury goods" are in a position to
demand collateral for their extensions of credit. These creditors
could easily obtain a security interest in the goods sold,'125 and,
under the Uniform Commercial Code, such security interests
would ordinarily be automatically perfected.' 26 Thus, by simply in-
124. On the other hand, it is very sensible to impose this presumption upon an involun-
tary bankrupt for purchases made during the "gap period" which may exist between the
filing of the petition and the order for relief. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 303(g), (h)
(West Supp. 1985).
125. All that is required for a security interest to attach is that (a) either the collateral be
in possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement or the debtor sign a security agree-
ment which contains a description of the collateral, (b) value be given, and (c) the debtor
have rights in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1977). Obviously, anyone who is selling "lux-
ury goods" should be able to afford the few lines of ink necessary to meet these
requirements.
126. It seems clear that the "luxury goods" which the Code refers to will nearly always be
consumer goods under the U.C.C.-goods "used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family or household purposes." Id. § 9-109(1). Rarely will a debtor whose obligations are
primarily consumer debts be buying "luxury goods" for use in his/her business or for resale.
And, since the creditor is financing the purchase of the goods, the security interest retained
is a purchase money security interest. Id. § 9-107. Such security interests are automatically
perfected, unless the goods are subject to a certificate of title law. Id. § 9-302(d). The cost of
noting the security interest on a certificate of title is not likely to excessively burden the
seller of a Jaguar or a Mercedes.
In fairness to the creditors, however, it should be noted that, to a rather limited degree,
the protection given to an automatically perfected security interest is less than that given to
one perfected by filing. A consumer who buys consumer goods for consumer use takes free of
a security interest which is not perfected by filing if he/she does not know of the security
interest. Id. § 9-307(2). Although the security interest would continue in the proceeds of
sale, it would become unperfected shortly after the proceeds were received. Id. § 9-306. Un-
perfected security interests are, of course, inferior to the rights of the trustee/debtor in pos-
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cluding a sentence or two in the sale contract, and generally with-
out having to file a financing statement, such creditors could be-
come secured parties, holding secured claims in the bankruptcy
proceeding. The economic rationale for rewarding creditor indo-
lence in this regard with a new non-dischargeability provision is
thus by no means entirely clear. 127
V. LIMITATIONS ON DISCHARGE-REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENTS
The original Bankruptcy Code had, as one of its major goals, the
preservation of a debtor's "fresh start" through bankruptcy. One
aspect of this preservation was its substantial restriction of post-
discharge reaffirmation agreements. Virtually every state enforces
as a binding obligation a bankrupt's promise to pay a discharged
debt.12 s The Bankruptcy Act permitted such enforcement almost
without limitation.
While there is nothing intrinsically objectionable about a debtor
voluntarily making such repayment, the drafters of the Code ap-
parently believed that many creditors were unfairly inducing, and
many debtors foolishly agreeing to, reaffirmation. 129 Consequently,
the Code imposed a fairly elaborate procedure for reaffirmation
and rendered unenforceable any reaffirmation agreements which
did not comply with these requirements. 30 The agreement had to
session. Id. § 9-301; Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 544 (West Supp. 1985). Thus, the seller
of "luxury goods" who relied on automatic perfection would not be protected against the
improbable debtor who bought on a spree, resold the goods to another consumer, and drank
the proceeds. The seller would be protected against even this eventuality if it undertook the
less than monumental task of filing an appropriate financing statement.
127. In a very limited way, this provision is merely a reflection of the whole purpose of
income-based bankruptcy, which is to replace what has traditionally been the creditors' pro-
tection against non-payment (access to the debtor's assets) with a new protection (access to
the debtor's future income). The negative aspect of this is that it deprives the debtor of his/
her own protection against peonage-the inability of creditors to seize more than the
debtor's non-exempt assets at the time the debtor chooses bankruptcy. Giving this new non-
dischargeability protection to creditors is simply one way of giving creditors access to future
income as well as present assets, since the debt survives the discharge and may thus be
satisfied from the debtor's subsequently acquired property. Indeed, § 523(a)(2)(A) even
gives access to future income to creditors who specifically bargained for additional asset
protection (i.e., secured creditors), since the non-dischargeability presumption does not de-
pend upon the creditor for being wholly unsecured.
128. 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 17.33-17.37 (L. King 14th ed. 1978).
129. The primary legislative history is, however, rather vague. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1978).
130. Prior to BAFJA, Bankruptcy Code § 524(c) read, in full:
An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration for
which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under
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be made before the discharge was granted." 1 An individual debtor
who sought to reaffirm a consumer debt not secured by his/her real
property had to have court approval to do so. The court could ap-
prove the reaffirmation only if it determined that the agreement
imposed no undue hardship on the debtor and was in the debtor's
best interests, 132 or if the reaffirmation were entered into in good
faith and in settlement of dischargeability or redemption litiga-
tion.133 The debtor also had an absolute right to rescind the reaffir-
mation within thirty days after the agreement became enforcea-
ble.13 4  Finally, at the discharge hearing for any reaffirming
individual bankrupt, the court would inform the bankrupt of the
voluntary nature of reaffirmation and its legal consequences. 13 5
this title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under applicable nonban-
kruptcy law, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived, only if-
(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the discharge under section
727, 1141, or 1328 of this title;
(2) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement within 30 days after such agree-
ment becomes enforceable;
(3) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section have been complied with; and
(4) in a case concerning an individual, to the extent that such debt is a consumer
debt that is not secured by real property of the debtor, the court approves such
agreement as-
(A)(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor; or
(B)(i) entered into in good faith; and
(ii) in settlement 'of litigation under section 523 of this title [non-dis-
chargeability litigation], or providing for redemption under section 722 of this
title.
11 U.S.c. § 524(c) (1982) (amended 1984).
131. Id. § 524(c)(1).
132. Id. § 524(c)(4)(A).
133. Id. § 524(c)(4)(B).
134. Id. § 524(c)(2).
135. Id. § 524(d). It states in full:
In a case concerning an individual, when the court has determined whether to grant
or not to grant a discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328 of this title, the court
shall hold a hearing at which the debtor shall appear in person. At such hearing, the
court shall inform the debtor that a discharge has been granted or the reason why a
discharge has not been granted. If a discharge has been granted and if the debtor
desires to make an agreement of the kind specified in subsection (c) of this section [a
reaffirmation agreement], then at such hearing the court shall-
(1) inform the debtor-
(A) that such an agreement is not required under this title, under nonban-
kruptcy law, or under any agreement not made in accordance with the provisions
of subsection (c) of this section; and
(B) of the legal effect and consequences of-
(i) an agreement of the kind specified in subsection (c) of this section; and
(ii) a default under such an agreement;
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These requirements seem to have had their intended effect; con-
sequently, they were among the chief targets of BAFJA. Although
the timing and informational provisions have been retained with-
out change, 136 and the time for rescission extended to sixty days,'137
court supervision of reaffirmation agreements has been virtually
eliminated. Only those (presumably rare) bankrupts who are not
represented by counsel in the negotiation of their reaffirmation
agreement need to obtain court approval of it. 3 ' Even the unrepre-
sented bankrupt can reaffirm without court approval if the debt
reaffirmed is secured by real property. 3 9 In all other cases, the at-
(2) determine whether the agreement that the debtor desires to make complies
with the requirements of subsection (c)(6) of this subsection [sic], if the considera-
tion for such agreement is based in whole or in part on a consumer debt that is not
secured by real property of the debtor.
136. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA. § 524(c)(1), (c)(5), (d) (West Supp. 1985).
137. Id. § 524(c)(2), (4). It reads:
(c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration for
which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under
this title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under applicable nonban-
kruptcy law, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived, only if-
(2) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement which advises the
debtor that the agreement may be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or
within sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs
later, by giving notice of rescission to the holder of such claim;
(4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any time prior to discharge
or within sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs
later, by giving notice of rescission to the holder of such claim ....
138. Id. § 524(c)(6)(A). This section makes a reaffirmation agreement unenforceable
unless:
[I]n a case concerning an individual who was not represented by an attorney during
the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, the court approves such
agreement as-
(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;,
and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor.
139. Id. § 524(c)(6)(B). It states that "Subparagraph (A) [the provision on court ap-
proval] shall not apply to the extent that such debt is a consumer debt secured by real
property." This obviously means that any bankrupt who seeks to reaffirm any debt secured
by real estate, does not enjoy the benefit of judicial review, even if he/she was not repre-
sented by a lawyer during the negotiations. Note, however, that the provision says "to the
extent" the debt is secured by realty the court approval provisions do not apply. On the face
of it, this means that if a debt is secured only partially by realty, then only that part of the
debt may be reaffirmed without court approval. If so, attorneys representing creditors seek-
ing reaffirmation by an unrepresented debtor of a debt secured in part by realty and in part
by personalty (or which are in part unsecured) should be careful to allocate clearly in the
reaffirmation agreement the portion of the debt secured by the realty, and to have only that
portion reaffirmed.
In any event, the significance of this may be rather slight, since the reaffirmation must
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torney who negotiated the reaffirmation agreement on behalf of the
bankrupt must file an affidavit or declaration with the court which
states that the agreement is a voluntary and informed decision by
the bankrupt, and that it will put the bankrupt and his/her depen-
dents under no undue hardship.140 To this structure is appended
the pious wish that even those bankrupts who do not reaffirm will
voluntarily repay their debts.141
One problem not adequately addressed by BAFJA, which may
reduce the effectiveness of this streamlined procedure, is the re-
sponsibility of the lawyer to determine the accuracy of the "no
hardship" declaration. The obligation to certify "no hardship" cre-
ates a number of serious professional responsibility dilemmas for
the attorney. First, it puts the lawyer in the awkward, if not unten-
able, position of evaluating the client's ability to pay. How will at-
torneys-who are generally not expert financial advisors-make
this evaluation? What happens if the attorney guesses wrong? 142
Second, the declaration encompasses hardship to both the bank-
rupt and the bankrupt's dependents. What if the bankrupt assures
the attorney that reaffirmation will cause no hardship, but the ba-
sis of this assurance is that the bankrupt will stop paying for his/
her children's education? By including hardship to the dependents
in the declaration, section 524(c)(3) in effect forces the attorney to
consider and represent their interests. This may create an insolu-
ble conflict which would disqualify the attorney from further rep-
resentation of the bankrupt. Third, the attorney will sometimes be
forced to refuse to accede to the client's wish to reaffirm because
the lawyer (though not the client) believes that the proposed reaf-
occur prior to discharge, and thus during the pendency of the proceeding. During the pro-
ceeding, the bankrupt is likely to have had legal representation and will presumably avail
him/herself of the lawyer's advice regarding the reaffirmation.
140. Id. § 524(c)(3). A reaffirmation agreement is unenforceable unless:
[S]uch agreement has been filed with the court and, if applicable, accompanied by a
declaration or an affidavit of the attorney that represented the debtor during the
course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, which states that such
agreement-
(A) represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtor; and
(B) does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor.
Curiously, the section seems to permit the declaration to be made by any attorney who
negotiated "an" agreement to reaffirm for the debtor, not only the attorney who negotiated
the specific reaffirmation agreement in question. Surely Congress meant "the," instead of
"an," agreement.
141. Id. § 524(f).
142. He or she will get sued for malpractice, of course; but let us pass over that in silence.
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firmation will subject the client to undue hardship.
Sensible lawyers are likely to respond to these problems in either
of two ways. Some will routinely file the declaration on the repre-
sentation of the client that there will be no undue hardship. Others
will refuse to file the declaration in any but the most obvious cases,
such as reaffirmation of a fifty dollar debt. The first response will
frustrate the purpose of the requirement. The second will make it
quite difficult for creditors to obtain reaffirmation. Each response
constitutes a failure of the attorney to represent the client fully
and adequately. By routinely filing the declaration, the lawyer ab-
dicates the Code-imposed responsibility to review the bankrupt's
financial situation. By routinely refusing to file the declaration, the
lawyer ignores the fact that some reaffirmations are beneficial to,
and in any event desired by, the client. The declaration require-
ment thus imposes an undesirable burden on the attorney-client
relationship. It is an unnecessary burden as well, since the court
can just as easily make the determination that there will be no
undue hardship.
VI. RESTRICTION ON ACCESS TO DISCHARGE-EFFECT OF DISMISSAL
A final limitation on access to bankruptcy discharge is contained
in new subsection 109(f),14s which prohibits certain individuals
from qualifying for relief under the Code. If an individual has been
a bankrupt within 180 days prior to the order for relief,144 but the
prior proceeding was dismissed for failure to abide by the court's
orders, for failure to press the case forward, or upon request of the
bankrupt following a creditor's request for relief from the auto-
matic stay, the bankrupt does not qualify as a "debtor" under the
Bankruptcy Code. 45 This provision is obviously designed to avoid
143. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA. § 109(f) (West Supp. 1985) reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no individual may be a debtor
under this title who has been a debtor in a case pending under this title at any time
in the preceding 180 days if-
(1) the case was dismissed by the court for willful failure of the debtor to abide
by orders of the court, or to appear before the court in proper prosecution of the
case; or
(2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal of the case follow-
ing the filing of a request for relief from the automatic stay provided by section 362
of this title.
144. Id. Actually, the provision is somewhat unclear about the date to which the 180-day
period runs; this could be significant in an involuntary bankruptcy, in which the order for
relief may not occur on the same date as the filing of the petition. See supra note 124.
145. Id.
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situations in which a debtor repeatedly makes bad-faith bank-
ruptcy filings for the sole purpose of delaying creditors through the
automatic stay, and further to encourage diligence on the part of
good-faith bankrupts. On the whole it is unobjectionable, but may
not quite succeed in plugging the dike.
A truly bad-faith debtor may simply go ahead and file anyway;
the current official form for voluntary petitions lacks any require-
ment that the debtor disclose his/her ineligibility to file.146 Since
the mere filing of a voluntary petition triggers the automatic
stay,147 creditors could at least be delayed by the time it takes to
obtain a dismissal. More Machiavellian debtors may note that sec-
tion 109(f) prohibits a person falling within its provisions from be-
ing a "debtor"-not just from filing a voluntary petition.148 A
debtor who fears an involuntary petition might file a voluntary pe-
tition, get a friendly creditor to move for relief from the automatic
stay, then seek voluntary dismissal. If the court were to grant the
dismissal, the debtor would be immune from an involuntary action
for 180 days. Presumably, however, the courts would react nega-
tively to any obvious manipulation of this sort.
VII. CONCLUSION
BAFJA's restrictions on access to discharge in bankruptcy will
probably not radically change the shape of American bankruptcy
law. If, as suggested, a somewhat narrow reading of section 707(b)
prevails, the overwhelming majority of debtors will continue to
have a choice of liquidation or reorganization. Indeed, the presence
of the disposable income standard in Chapter 13 may even increase
the attractiveness of liquidation bankruptcies.
It is equally clear, however, that substantial sentiment exists for
a total restructuring of bankruptcy. There is no doubt that a major
segment of the credit industry wants to change bankruptcy from
the asset-based liquidation paradigm to the income-based reorgan-
ization paradigm. The traditional reorganization chapters, while
certainly representing the opening wedge of this approach, usually
created only voluntary proceedings. While, to a certain extent, the
Bankruptcy Reform Act changed this for certain business reorgani-
146. See Official Bankruptcy Form 1.
147. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.CA § 362(a) (West Supp. 1985).
148. Id. § 109(f).
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zations,149 Congress then was quite clear that no consumer could
be forced to reorganize involuntarily; indeed the possibility that
such a proceeding could work was peremptorily dismissed. 150 To at
least a small degree, BAFJA changes this; for at least some con-
sumer debtors, reorganization under Chapter 13 will be the only
available bankruptcy vehicle. If section 707(b) is read as broadly as
some creditors would no doubt like, the number of such debtors
will be quite large. Thus, it is at least possible that BAFJA will
prove as significant to the structure and future of bankruptcy law
as the 1898 Act, the 1938 Amendments, and the 1978 Code.
149. See supra note 22.
150. Id.
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